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Gender gap in pay and promotions
Job assignment
Fast tracks
Internal labor marketsWetest a job ladders theoryof career progressionwithin internal labormarkets asdevelopedbyLazear andRosen
(1990). The theory argues that gender promotion gaps are due to sorting of men and women into career tracks
with different promotion opportunities based on ex ante quit probabilities. Analyzing US federal government
employees using a dynamic unobserved panel data model, we find that job assignment is one of the strongest
predictors of gender differences in promotion. We also find that women have to jump higher performance
hurdles to promote across grades, but, within grades, their promotion probabilities are comparable to those of
men. In this organization, women can be found in both fast- and slow-track jobs, based on their promotion
history, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity is revealed to the firm over the worker's career.hn (2000); for a survey on the
B.V.
rnica.irPublished by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Research on the gender pay gap has recently focused on career
differences within large hierarchical organizations. In part this trend
has been driven by limited information on human capital endowments
in standard public-use data (Donald and Hamermesh, 2004).1 The data
limitations present obstacles to distinguishing among competing
theories on gender pay gaps, including discrimination, occupational
sorting, and job assignment. Separating unobservable characteristics,
such as ability or quit propensities, from discrimination and endow-
ment differences has been especially difficult. While women's labor
force participation, educational attainment, and representation in
traditionally-male occupations has risen dramatically in recent years,
the question remains: will these changes be enough to eradicate
gender-based differences in wages and career progression?
Following the recent trend of studying male–female career
differences in the context of firm-level decisions on optimal incentive
pay and promotions, we focus on professional workers in a large
hierarchical organization. Using longitudinal data on U.S. federal
government employees, we test hypotheses generated from the Lazear
and Rosen (1990) jobs-based model of gender differences in career
progression. The model suggests that gender pay differences arise from
the assignment of males to ‘fast track’ jobs that require heavierinvestments in specific human capital and thus stronger job attach-
ment. Because women have higher productivity in non-market
activities, they are more likely to separate and, therefore, are assigned
to jobs that have flatter career paths. Using a dynamic unobserved
panel data model, we find that job assignment is one of the strongest
predictors of gender differences in promotions. However, we also find
that women can be on both fast and slow tracks, based on their
promotion history, suggesting that the separation probability is
revealed to the firm over the worker's career. Contributing to the
internal labor market literature more generally, we find that promo-
tions resulting only in wage growth are characterized by different
dynamics than promotions involving a change in responsibilities.
2. Background
Lazear and Rosen (hereafter L&R) distinguish between two types
of jobs: type-A jobs that require extensive firm-specific training, and
type-B jobs that do not require as much training or job attachment. In
return for extensive training, type-A jobs offer better promotion
prospects and higher pay over the life-cycle than type-B jobs.
Organizations offer earnings-tenure profiles within each job ladder
to create incentives for workers to undertake the required specific
training. Since the payoff to training is delayed, workers who expect to
leave are less likely to undertake, or to be offered, the required
training. Asymmetric information is important in the optimal pay
structure because firms cannot observe an individual's propensity to
leave and workers have no incentive to voluntarily reveal their true
propensities. To induce worker sorting, firms set higher ability
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if firms are unable to design contracts that induce employees to self-
select into different job ladders, the ability thresholds solve the
internal promotion problem. As testable implications, this model
suggests that: (1) average observed ability is higher for women than
for men; (2) women earn less than men because they occupy lower-
tier jobs; and (3) within jobs women earn at least as much as men (or
more) because of their higher ability.
Lazear and Rosen build upon the idea that firms use promotions to
sort employees by ability, thus resulting in individuals who move
faster up the hierarchy as if they were on ‘fast tracks.’ Baker et al.
(1994b) find that within a large firm employee wages are positively
correlated over time. In addition, wage increases are positively
correlated with current wage, suggesting that employees who are
more able or who accumulate more human capital advance along the
hierarchy more quickly.2 The L&R model assumes that the human
capital accumulation varies by gender, hence resulting in different
tracks for men and women.
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1997) (hereafterW&Z) extend the
L&R model to explain job assignment at entry. They argue that
employers apply the same considerations when assigning workers to
entry jobs that are considered ‘promotion-track’ positions. Using cross-
sectional data, W&Z analyze gender differences in initial assignment
and promotion. If a person is observed in a job rank that is higher than
the corresponding endowment (mainly education) they assume that
the person has been promoted. They decompose the gender gap into a
portion explained by the ability threshold and a portion explained by
endowment differences. They find that women are concentrated in
lower-tier jobs and must possess higher endowments to reach higher-
ranked positions. However, differences in endowments and predicted
turnover account for only a small portion of the observed differences in
promotion and initial placement. They conclude that there is unequal
treatment of women in professional careers.
Jones and Makepeace (1996) use personnel data from a U.K.
financial firm to test the L&R model. Contrary to W&Z, they find that
69–87% of gender differences in job grades are due to endowment
differences, most notably differences in tenure. They also find that
women face higher ability thresholds for promotion.
These represent only two studies in a growing literature on
promotion and career progression, but are the only ones that
explicitly test the L&R model.3 However, neither study models the
dynamic nature of promotions within a career ladder. This is
important because higher-order promotions depend upon the entire
history of past promotions, and L&R attribute gender differences to
these career paths differences.43. Empirical approach
In testing the L&R hypotheses, we must distinguish two competing
factors. First, as identical employees move up the hierarchy, fewer
possible promotion steps remain and conditional promotion probabil-
ities decline over time. Second, future promotions may depend on
success at “key” career points, so promotions in previous periods may
causally affect future promotions. In the L&R model future promotions2 This evidence is obtained across job levels. Within-job levels Baker et al. (1994a)
find a negative correlation between both percentage and dollar increases in wages and
current wages (referred to as the ‘green card effect’). For a theoretical treatment of fast
tracks, see Bernhardt (1995).
3 Cabral et al. (1981) and Gerhart and Milkovich (1987) find that women enter in
lower positions than men with comparable qualifications, which explains their lower
promotion rates and salaries. Ginther and Hayes (1999) find substantial gender
differences in promotion among academics even after controlling for productivity
differences. McDowell et al. (1999, 2001) find that promotion rates of female academic
economists are below those of men, but these differences have narrowed over time.
4 Belzil and Bognanno (2008) model career progression within firms in a dynamic
setting. Their data, however, do not include information on gender.depend on the past history of promotions when workers are placed on
certain career tracks. This temporal correlation in promotions repre-
sents true state dependence. In contrast, the temporal correlation in
promotions as a result of the constraints imposed by the hierarchy
would be largely spurious. Unobserved heterogeneity complicates the
estimation of state dependence. If unobserved heterogeneity persists
over time, we cannot distinguish between the effects of job assignment
(differences in state dependence) and unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, we cannot distinguish whether women are in lower-level
positions because of their endowments (including unobservables) or
because they are assigned to different tracks.
The L&R model suggests that unobserved heterogeneity (which
includes ex ante quit probabilities) explains the different career paths
for men and women. Their model suggests positive state dependence,
especially for the type-A jobs that provide more promotion possibil-
ities. The L&R model, however, does not analyze these propositions
against the constraints of a finite firm hierarchy. Incorporating a
limited number of promotion steps induces negative state depen-
dence, whichmay be stronger for type-A jobs because incumbents are
more likely to face these constraints or to face them sooner. In
addition, if we fail to account for the firm's hierarchy, differential job
assignments by gender may generate the spurious finding that
women promote at higher rates than men because men tend to hit
the hierarchical constraints earlier. Therefore, we view state depen-
dence as the net effect of a finite hierarchy and being in a fast or slow
job track.5 Finally, the L&R model also implies that the assignment of
women to type-B jobs is optimal. Empirically, this can only be
validated if we also observe that, within jobs, men and women
promote at similar rates. Otherwise, the differential assignment could
also be due to discrimination at entry.
To reduce the set of unobservables that drive promotion, we focus
on high-abilitywhite-collarworkers within an organization and control
for variables that are typically unavailable in public data, such as job
performance, firm-specific human capital, and promotion history. We
specify the following dynamic model for our latent variable:
y4it = ρyi;t−1 + δfemalei + zitγ + ci + uit ð1Þ
where yit represents promotion at time t, zit represents strictly
exogenous variables, ci represents unobserved heterogeneity and uit
represents a random disturbance.6 Our exogenous variables include
performance ratings, dummies for advanced degrees (master's and
doctorate), race (black, Hispanic, and other), age, departments (Army,
Air Force, and headquarters), occupation (professional, administrative,
clerical, technical, other white collar), tenure, and time dummies. One
assumption inEq. (1) is that themodel correctly specifies the promotion
dynamics and only one lag of yit belongs in themodel.7 We also assume
that cidoes not vary bygender but by individual, to allow females to also
be type A and males to also be type B. The L&R model suggests that the
unobserved heterogeneity that drives job assignment and promotion is
related to performance and job attachment rather than to gender itself.
Occupational sorting may partially explain observed gender
differences in careers, in which case occupation may be endogenous
in Eq. (1). However, occupational sorting may be driven by a similar5 See Belzil and Bognanno (2004) for an alternative way of investigating fast tracks
while circumventing the spurious negative correlation due to the finite hierarchy. Our
focus in this paper is in estimating the relative difference in state dependence between
women and men, rather than obtaining estimates of the state dependence in
promotions (free from any spuriousness induced by administrative constraints). Since
both men and women face the same hierarchical constraints, for our purposes, the
spuriousness induced by the finite hierarchy does not pose a problem. Additionally,
women in our sample are observed to promote all the way to the top, thus eliminating
the possibility that men and women face implicitly different hierarchies.
6 We assume that unobserved heterogeneity remains fixed over time. Implicitly, this
requires that a type-A worker remains a type A and does not become a type B, at least
not during the period under consideration.
7 We relax this assumption later.
1000 E. Pema, S. Mehay / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 998–1009heterogeneity as the one captured by ci. Therefore, we estimate
models with and without occupation dummies. Whether we should
include tenure in Eq. (1) is also debatable. Since women have weaker
labor force attachment, they also have lower tenure, which may
account for their concentration in type-B jobs.8 However, tenure also
proxies for firm-specific capital, and in the federal personnel system is
an indicator of hierarchical position in a firm, since workers are
periodically reviewed and awarded step and grade increases.9
Testing H0:ρ=0 in Eq. (1) amounts to testing whether there is
state dependence after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (ci)
and observable characteristics. This is typically the focus of studies
that specify models similar to Eq. (1). However, we are most
interested in testing whether state dependence and the effect of
performance ratings vary by gender. If state dependence varies by
gender it suggests that men and women are on different career tracks.
Also, finding that performance ratings have different impacts on
promotion would imply that women must have higher ability for the
same promotion. To test these hypotheses we include interactions of
female with lagged promotions and performance ratings.
To address the issue of the finite hierarchy we include a variable
controlling for job level in time t−1. This variable captures the
employee's position in the hierarchy and proxies for the remaining
steps available for advancement. Additionally, estimations that include
pay grade yield implications forwithin-job gender promotiondifferences.
Estimating the parameters in Eq. (1) amounts tomodeling the density
of yit conditional on a lagged dependent variable, strictly exogenous
controls, and unobserved heterogeneity. The main problem is that ci is
unobserved. Ideally, we would like to avoid making restrictive assump-
tions about the relationship between zi and ci. Treating ci as parameters to
be estimated or transforming Eq. (1) to eliminate ci, similar to the linear
case, introduces the incidental parameters problem and leads to
inconsistent estimates. Heckman (1981a) shows that the problem is
exacerbated in fixed effects probit models that include lagged dependent
variables. In the case where Eq. (1) does not contain lagged dependent
variables, Chamberlain (1980) proposes approximating the conditional
distribution of ci given zi with a normal distribution with an expectation
linear in zi and a constant variance. Specifying a dynamicmodel, however,
introduces the initial conditionsproblem.That is,wemustdecidewhether
to model y0 as a constant or a random variable. Ignoring how the process
of promotions beganwould assume either that the history of promotions
and their determinants prior to ourfirst observation are irrelevant, or that
this process is stationary. Of greatest concern is that treating y0 as a
constant implies that y0 and ci are independent.10 In the context of this
paper, this would amount to assuming that unobserved heterogeneity
(including ability,motivation, or quit propensity) is uncorrelatedwith the
first observed promotion. Since this assumption is quite strong, we
assume instead that y0 is stochastic, and possibly correlated with ci.
Wooldridge (2005) offers a practical solution for the initial
conditions problem in the non-linear dynamic case. In the spirit of8 This holds true for our sample. Women have about three less years of tenure, but
are only one year younger than men on average.
9 To reduce multicollinearity between a time-varying tenure variable and the time
dummies we include log(tenuret) in the model. Controlling for the potentially higher
separation rates of women (via tenure) is also important since we do not deal with
sample attrition. We ignore this problem because our goal is to estimate gender
differences among homogenous (and, therefore, comparable) workers to separate
competing theories. Additionally, L&R assume that the same factor (higher non-
market productivity) drives both quits and job assignment. Since model (1) explicitly
includes unobserved heterogeneity, adjusting the parameters for attrition requires
that we propose different reasons for women's weaker job attachment. Finally,
attrition does not have a tractable solution in non-linear panel unobserved effects
models. Available solutions (such as inverse probability weighting) assume away
unobserved heterogeneity, whereas semi-parametric methods do not allow for an
estimation of state dependence. We thank Jeff Wooldridge for clarifying these points.
10 Even if we were to focus only on new entrants (for whom we observe the entire
promotion history), by considering the first promotion as a non-stochastic event we
would still be assuming that the initial promotion is independent of unobserved
heterogeneity.Chamberlain's approach to probit models with unobserved hetero-
geneity, Wooldridge suggests modeling the distribution of ci condi-
tional on the exogenous controls zi and the initial value y0.11
Following Wooldridge, we propose the following model to approx-
imate the relationship among ci, zi, and y0:
ci = α0 + α1yi0 + ziα2 + ai
where ai j yi0; zið Þ∼Normal 0; σ2a
  ð2Þ
Here zi represents all of the exogenous variables in all time periods.
Combining Eqs. (1) and (2) suggests the following latent variable
model for estimation:
y4it = ρyi;t−1 + δfemalei + zitγ + α0 + α1yi0 + ziα2 + ai + uit




One useful aspect of this approach is that we can obtain consistent
parameter estimates via standard conditional maximum likelihood
methods. In addition, we can investigate how unobserved heteroge-
neity relates to observable covariates.
4. Personnel data
TheU.S. DefenseDepartment (DOD) employs nearly one-third of the
entire U.S. federal civilian workforce. About 75% of DOD employees are
inwhite-collar occupations,many of whom are scientists and engineers
(Gibbs, 2006). Most college-educated employees are paid under the
General Schedule or General Management (GS/GM) pay system, which
consists of 15 grades and 10 stepswithin each grade.Within-grade step
increases are based on satisfactory job performance and time-in-grade
requirements. Jumps in grade levels, however, are largely based on
performance. Certain grade levels are seldomused in theGS/GM system
(typically 4, 6, 8, and10), soworkersmay jumpmore thanonepay grade
upon promotion in the mid-range of the hierarchy.12
We define a promotion as a change in grade level from one period
to the next. Although dependent on performance, these promotions
may also depend on time-in-grade requirements and, often, do not
involve a change in duties and responsibilities, but simply higher pay
and a change in job title. Attaining a supervisory or managerial
position represents a different kind of career advancement. Managers
are responsible for the success of an agency or program and have
budgetary authority. Supervisors plan, schedule, and coordinate work
operations and have authority to hire, assign, promote, reward, and
fire employees (Lewis, 1986). Since such positions require consider-
able firm-specific knowledge, this promotion will depend both on
expected future performance and on predicted attrition. Whether an
employee achieves a supervisory or managerial position constitutes
our second measure of career advancement.1311 Chamberlain (1980) offers a similar suggestion for the autoregressive case without
any explanatory variables. Heckman (1981a) proposes a solution for the dynamic
probit model with explanatory variables that involves modeling the distribution of y0
conditional on (zi, ci), and then specifying a distribution for ci given zi. However, the
distribution of y0 given (zi, ci) can be difficult to find or approximate (Hsiao, 1986),
and, computationally, Wooldridge's approach is much simpler.
12 Since pay in the federal system is a deterministic function of step, grade,
supervisory duties, and area cost of living, we focus on promotions as indicators of
career progression instead of wages. Grade levels may be misleading as indicators of
advancement, since going from GS4 to GS6 is not twice as valuable as promoting from
GS6 to GS7. Hence, we focus on whether a promotion occurs in any given period,
conditional on the current grade level. For a description of the federal civil service
internal labor market and promotion system, see Johnson and Libecap (1989).
13 One additional step represents approximately a 3% pay increase, while a
promotion to a higher grade represents about a 10% pay increase. The dollar value
of a career step increase during this period was $789, whereas the value of a
promotion was $2120 (U.S.GAO, 1999). Our data indicate that supervisors/managers,
in the same grade, make about $3000 more than non-supervisors.
Table 2
Differences in performance by gender and pay grade.
Pay
grade
Difference in performance ratings N
(1) (2)
GS3 0.037 0.056 377
(0.098) (0.108)
GS4 −0.272 −0.193 1198
(0.073)*** (0.080)**
GS5 −0.308 −0.274 3095
(0.035)*** (0.036)***
GS6 −0.299 −0.304 1237
(0.063)*** (0.066)***
GS7 −0.239 −0.227 3790
(0.026)*** (0.027)***
GS8 −0.558 −0.546 386
(0.092)*** (0.099)***
GS9 −0.269 −0.290 9057
(0.019)*** (0.019)***
GS10 −0.161 −0.100 369
(0.092)* (0.126)
GS11 −0.232 −0.222 18,624
(0.014)*** (0.015)***
GS12 −0.159 −0.142 33,227
(0.012)*** (0.012)***
GS13 −0.093 −0.102 23,939
(0.015)*** (0.016)***
GS14 −0.138 −0.104 11,630
(0.023)*** (0.024)***




Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Black 0.044 (0.204) 0.176 (0.381)
Hispanic 0.025 (0.157) 0.026 (0.161)
Master's degree 0.206 (0.404) 0.175 (0.380)
Doctorate 0.042 (0.200) 0.016 (0.126)
Army 0.906 (0.291) 0.909 (0.288)
Air Force 0.034 (0.180) 0.033 (0.178)
Professional 0.688 (0.463) 0.351 (0.477)
Administrative 0.253 (0.435) 0.424 (0.494)
Technical 0.044 (0.205) 0.082 (0.274)
Clerical 0.058 (0.233) 0.191 (0.393)
Performance rating
(1=highest, 5=lowest), 1986
2.291 (0.767) 2.295 (0.821)
Performance rating
(1=highest, 5=lowest), 1992
1.702 (0.702) 1.552 (0.675)
Grade level, 1986 11.549 (2.193) 9.362 (2.968)
Grade level, 1992 12.532 (1.571) 10.951 (2.497)
Promote to a higher grade level
during 1986–1992
0.180 (0.384) 0.249 (0.432)
% Promote once 40.41% 42.19%
% Promote twice 12.71% 21.7%
% Promote three times 2.08% 4.68%
In supervisory/managerial position
any time during 1986–1992
0.314 (0.464) 0.164 (0.371)
Tenure 13.083 (7.743) 9.888 (6.093)
Age in 1986 37.608 (7.941) 36.510 (8.015)
Observations 19,462 8,529
Time–person observations 77,848 34,116
1001E. Pema, S. Mehay / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 998–1009Civil servants are evaluated each year on their performance, based
on a scale that ranges in descending order from 1 to 5. Employees who
receive a rating of 5 can be reassigned, demoted, or removed from the
job. If an employee's rating exceeds 3, the agency is required to deny
within-grade pay increases. We employ these appraisals as proxies for
performance, with the understanding that, being uniform within the
organization, they carry more significance within a given job level.
Civil service data are advantageous for several reasons. First, unlike
organizations in the private sector, where job levels must be inferred
from often vaguely-defined job titles or empirically determined, the
hierarchy in the GS/GM system is well-defined. Changes in grade level
and attainment of supervisory positions constitute clear-cut promo-
tions. Second, the causal link between promotions and pay in the
internal labor market literature is subject to debate. In some organiza-
tions promotions serve as a non-pecuniary reward. Where promotions
are associated with higher pay, some studies have found evidence that
promotions result in higher wages (consistent with incentive pay
schemes) and other studies have found that wage growth results in
promotions (consistent with unobserved heterogeneity driving both
wages and promotions) (Baker et al., 1994a,b). This complicates the
analysis of gender differences, especially since L&R suggest that the
heterogeneity that drives promotions varies by gender. Furthermore, a
number of studies suggest that not only promotion rates, but also
returns to promotion may differ by gender. Some studies find that
females promote at lower rates but experience similar wage growth
(McCue, 1996; Olson and Becker, 1983), whereas others find that
women promote at higher rates but obtain lower raises (Barnett et al.,
2000; Hersch and Viscusi, 1996). The L&R theory explains the wage gap
as the result of the different promotion paths between A and B jobs.
However, the theory assumes that wages are attached to jobs, thus
implying that the same promotion would generate the same wage
growth for a woman as for a man. In the federal civil service, pay is a
deterministic function of job level; hence, promotions and pay move in
tandem for both men and women. Gender differences in wages,
therefore, would have to be the result of different promotion tracks,
rather than differential incentive schemes for men and women, or
different wage growth for women promoting to the same position.
We collected data for all GS/GM employees continuously employed
between 1986 and 1992 from personnel files maintained by the Defense
ManpowerDataCenter. The samplewas restricted to full-timeemployees,
to those with at least a Bachelor's degree, and to workers with ages 20 to
55. We removed veterans from the sample since they receive priority in
hiring, theirmilitary service is countedas tenure in the federal civil service,
and they are predominantly male.14 The final sample contained 27,965
employees who were followed for a six-year period from 1986 until
1992.15 Information on a worker's evaluations, grade promotions, and
promotion to supervisor were available every two years.
Table 1 provides summary statistics. At first sight, the L&R
implications with respect to differences in performance appear valid.
While average performance ratings in 1986 are similar for men and
women, in 1992women receive better performance ratings thanmen, by
about one-thirdof a standarddeviation.Although the same rating system
is used for all grades, obtaining a certain rating may be more difficult in
higher grades or in certain occupations. Therefore, we investigate these
performance differences separately for each grade level.
Table 2 compares performance ratings for males and females
obtained from random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
estimations. Column (1) presents results that condition only on
time fixed effects, whereas themodels in column (2) also condition on14 The sample is also restricted to individuals with non-missing observations in all
four periods because our empirical strategy requires a balanced panel.
15 We chose 1992 as the end date to avoid the turbulence introduced by the
personnel drawdown of the 1990s when the government offered separation bonuses
and the federal workforce fell dramatically (U. S. GAO, 1999).race, education, service, occupation, and tenure. Column (1) shows
that women receive higher evaluations in almost all grade levels. This
result does not change when we control for demographics, education,
service, occupation, and tenure in column (2), suggesting that the(0.036)*** (0.038)***
All −0.108 −0.116 111,964
(0.007)*** (0.007)***
Notes. The estimated differences in performance ratings for women versus men were
obtained by running separate random effects GLS regressions for each grade level,
initially adjusting for time effects (column 1) and next adjusting for variation in
demographics, education, service, occupation, and tenure (column 2).
⁎ significant at 10%; ⁎⁎ significant at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ significant at 1%.
Fig. 1. Gender differences in career progression.
16 Many firms set limits on pay increases or pay range within each job level. These
administrative rules can induce pay compression, and their structure usually results in
larger wage increases for those at the bottom of the wage distribution in a given job
level, and smaller raises for those at the top. Baker et al. (1994a) provide evidence of
‘green card’ effects by showing that, within a given job level, those in higher salary
quartiles earn lower percentage raises (see also Belzil and Bognanno, 2008).
1002 E. Pema, S. Mehay / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 998–1009performance difference is not due to systematic variation in the
observables. Interestingly, performance differences appear larger in
lower grade levels, but narrow further up the hierarchy. This
observation is consistent with the hypothesis that over time the
true ability of the worker is revealed to the employer.
Perhaps due to their better performance females have much
higher promotion rates (.25 versus .18 for men) and are also more
likely to receive multiple promotions. However, while the average
male is a GS11 in 1986, the average female is a GS9. Males move up to
GS12 by 1992, while women move up to GS11. Fig. 1 illustrates the
transition across grade levels for each gender. While females are more
evenly distributed across grade levels in 1986, men are more tightly
concentrated in higher grades. Therefore, another reason women
promote at higher rates is because they are concentrated in lower-
level positions and havemore opportunities for advancement. Despite
higher overall promotion rates, women are about half as likely to
become supervisors and managers as men (.16 versus .31). This in
part may be due to the large gender gap in tenure.
With respect to promotion dynamics, about 80% of individuals
promoting in the current period did not promote in the previous period.
Alternatively, about 74% of individuals who promote in t−1 do not
promote at time t. These promotion patterns suggest a negative state
dependence. This could be due to the limited number of steps in the
hierarchy or the possibility that higher-level promotions are increasingly
more difficult to attain. However, we also observe about 4584 individuals
whopromotebothat time t−1andat time t. The intertemporal correlation
ofpromotionsover timeweakens substantially after twotimeperiods,with
only 803 occurrences of promotions three periods in a row (in t−2, t−1,
and t). Supervisory positions are characterized by stronger persistence.
About 91% of those in supervisory positions in time t also occupy such
positions in time t−1.One-third of supervisorsmaintained these positions
for threeperiods in a row. Therefore, it appears that promotions involving a
change in responsibilities are characterized by entirely different dynamicsthan promotions that only result in wage growth. We believe the latter
would be more prone to administrative constraints, such as limited
hierarchical steps and so-called ‘green card’ effects.16
5. Findings
The L&R model produces testable implications for both the
position of females relative to males within the organization as a
whole and within each grade level. We investigate both sets of
differences by first focusing on the distribution of females in the
hierarchy for the entire organization, and later condition upon grade
level to investigate within-grade dynamics. Table 3 presents estimates
of grade promotions without conditioning on initial grade level, thus
providing across grade comparisons.
5.1. Estimates of grade promotions
In Table 3 we find strong state dependence across all specifications.
The negative sign of prior promotions suggests that a previous-period
promotion makes a promotion in the current period less likely. This
could be due to hierarchical constraints or to the possibility that higher-
level promotions are more difficult to attain (or both). Models (1)–(4)
assume that a single promotion lag adequately captures the promotion
dynamics. If the previous-period promotion has taken into account the
entire work history of the employee, then one lag may be sufficient.
However, if time-in-grade requirements pose constraints that make it
difficult to promote in two successive periods, then we should include
1003E. Pema, S. Mehay / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 998–1009more promotion lags. Inmodels (5)–(8)we add a second promotion lag
to our models.17 Adding the second lag reveals even more negative
persistence in the promotion process, with both lags carrying a similar
weight in the promotion probability. The state dependence here is the
net effect of hierarchical constraints, more challenging promotions
along the hierarchy, and potential fast/slow tracks in the organization.
Since these elements have opposing signs, empirically, state depen-
dence can be either positive or negative. Given that we are focusing on
highly-educated, white-collar workers, hierarchical constraints may be
especially binding; thus, the hierarchy-driven negative state depen-
dence may dominate.18 19
In column (1) women aremore likely to be promoted than men by
6.2 percentage points. When we control for occupation and tenure in
model (2), gender differences narrow substantially (to 3.4 points),
suggesting that endowments are important in explaining gender
differences. Similarly, in themore flexiblemodels with two promotion
lags, the gender gap narrows from 7.5 to 4.2 points when including
occupation and tenure. Since all regressions control for performance
ratings, the higher promotion rates for women are not due to their
higher ratings, but may be driven by the fact that women are
concentrated in lower-level positions and have more room for
advancement. At this stage, this finding suggests that the incidence
of promotions is more frequent among women.
Are men and women on different career tracks? In model (3) the
interaction of femalewith lagged promotion indicates that women are
on a faster track than men. The predicted state dependence for men is
about−25.7 percentage points, whereas for women it is about−16.5
percentage points. Although both men and women face hierarchical
constraints, women appear to be less bound by them. Among workers
who do not promote in the previous period, women are also more
likely to promote in the current period than men (by 2.2 points in
model (3)). The more flexible models (5)–(8) that include two lags of
promotions, confirm these results. The interactions of femalewith past
promotions (yt−1 and yt−2) suggest that women's careers are
characterized by a significantly different state dependence than
those of men.
The effect of performance ratings suggests that better performers
are more likely to be promoted. This in itself is noteworthy, since
some prior studies have failed to find a link between pay and
performance in internal labor markets (e.g. Medoff and Abraham,
1980).17 Adjacent periods in these data are two calendar years apart. Therefore, when
controlling for promotiont-2, we are essentially controlling for promotions during a
four-year period. More promotion lags are not possible with these data due to the
relatively short panel.
18 Another explanation is that continuous promotions and a general lack of
demotions move individuals to the position beyond which they have little competence
(also referred to as the “Peter Principle”).
19 It should be noted that controlling for past promotions and transitions through
grade levels is a rough way of taking into account the entire history of individual
achievements. For this purpose, Belzil and Bognanno (2004) construct a variable that
takes into account both the first observed position in the firm and the history of
promotions. This variable, termed “speed of promotion”, is calculated as the ratio of
the number of levels reached at any point in time and imputed experience. However,
in this specific setting, using speed of promotion introduces a few problems. First,
because individuals typically jump two levels with mid-range promotions but only one
level in high-level promotions, such a variable would weigh more heavily mid-range
promotions. This may distort our gender comparisons since women initially are more
heavily represented in the middle of the hierarchy. Second, in our data, everyone has a
college degree or more, so a good number of people promote to the top levels and
remain there. In the Belzil and Bognanno data, the finite hierarchy is less binding, since
about 0.2% of the individuals in their sample are in the top two positions compared to
15% in our data. In this paper, when conditioning upon age, education, tenure with the
firm, as well as grade levels in all periods, we are essentially controlling for differences
in upward movement among employees, although perhaps not in the most precise
way. Future research, especially that focusing on state dependence in promotions,
should investigate various definitions of state dependence insofar as the data and the
institutional setting allow.Do women have to jump a higher ability threshold to promote? In
model (4) the interaction of female with performance ratings is
positive and significant, suggesting that women do face higher
promotion hurdles. The implied effect is also practically large: A
male who improves his performance rating from 2 to 1, increases his
promotion chances by 2.7 percentage points, compared to only 1.2
percentage points for a woman.
The effect of tenure is negative across all estimations. Although
surprising, it partially reflects the fact that longer-tenuredworkers are
higher in the hierarchy and have fewer remaining ranks. This finding
is not unusual if we recall that grade promotions in this organization
are more akin to wage growth in the private sector. Previous studies
have found that green card effects can lead to smaller salary raises for
workers toward the top of their grade. Baker et al. (1994a,b) also point
out that in the presence of fast tracks, holding everything constant,
employees with more tenure are the ones that have advanced more
slowly, and may have lower ability or lower human capital
accumulation rates.20
The estimated parameters of Eq. (2) in panel B of Table 3 indicate
how unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with observables.21 We
find that the first promotion is very strongly correlated with
unobserved heterogeneity. However, the correlation between unob-
served heterogeneity and the initial promotion is significantly weaker
for females. In models (1)–(4) a history of good performance is
positively correlated with unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting that
unobservables are ability-related. This finding is relevant for other
studies that include a sparser set of controls and a more heteroge-
neous sample. In model (4) when we interact female with
performance ratings we find that unobserved heterogeneity is
negatively correlated with women's job performance. These findings
are consistent with the L&R hypothesis that unobserved heterogene-
ity includes factors (e.g., higher productivity in non-market activities)
that reduce the likelihood of females being on a fast track. Models (5)–
(8) confirm the finding that the first promotion is correlated with
important unobservables, but they do not indicate any differences by
gender in this respect. Similarly, these models reveal no clear pattern
on the relation between performance ratings and heterogeneity.
These findings suggest that unobserved heterogeneity becomes more
random in nature as we better capture the dynamics of promotions.
Next, we focus on within-grade gender differences in promotion.
Estimates in Table 4 condition on pay grade in the previous period to
control for each employee's hierarchical position. Due to the small
number of individuals who promote three periods in a row (about 803
over the entire period and across all pay grades), when conditioning
upon grade level we cannot obtain convergence for the models that
include two promotion lags. Therefore, Table 4 presents models with
only one performance lag, but a full history of progress across pay
grades in all periods (in addition to the full history of performance
ratings). The estimates indicate that state dependence declines
substantially after controlling for hierarchical position. This may
occur because including grade levels as an explanatory variable
removes the spuriousness induced by the finite hierarchy. However,
the estimated state dependence remains negative, consistent with the
assumption that higher-level promotions are more challenging or20 Other explanations have been offered. Several studies have found a negative
return to seniority in academia (see for example Ransom, 1993). One theory suggests
that the firm has monopsony power over workers that have been with it longer, since
they are more attached to the organization and the location (Hamermesh, 1988).
When investigating returns to skills in the DOD, Gibbs (2006) finds that DOD did not
experience problems in hiring and retaining high-skilled scientists and engineers even
in the face of a growing earnings gap between the private and the public sector. He
suggests that engineers and scientists in DOD may have a strong attachment to the
organization, either due to job match, non-pecuniary factors (patriotism, job stability),
or access to labs and research funding.
21 Since unobserved heterogeneity does not have any well-defined units of
measurement, we do not calculate marginal effects for the coefficients of Eq. (2).
Table 3
Across grade estimates of promotions to a higher grade level.
Eq. (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Promotet−1 −1.058⁎ −1.100⁎ −1.217⁎ −1.100⁎ −0.644⁎ −0.629⁎ −0.740⁎ −0.611⁎
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.049) (0.101) (0.094) (0.116)
[−0.237] [−0.241] [−0.257] [−0.241] [−0.147] [−0.144] [−0.165] [−0.141]
Promotet−2 −0.650⁎ −0.602⁎ −0.662⁎ −0.584⁎
(0.052) (0.096) (0.092) (0.109)
[−0.135] [−0.128] [−0.137] [−0.125]
Female 0.203⁎ 0.113⁎ 0.073⁎ −0.071⁎⁎⁎ 0.281⁎ 0.158⁎ 0.050⁎⁎ −0.072
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.038) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.048)
[0.062] [0.034] [0.022] [−0.021] [0.075] [0.042] [0.013] [−0.018]
Ratingt−1 −0.047⁎ −0.078⁎ −0.077⁎ −0.093⁎ −0.148⁎ −0.152⁎ −0.152⁎ −0.185⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)
[−0.014] [−0.023] [−0.023] [−0.027] [−0.038] [−0.039] [−0.039] [−0.048]
Log (tenuret) −0.464⁎ −0.469⁎ −0.467⁎ −0.656⁎ −0.670⁎ −0.657⁎
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.034) (0.032) (0.037)










Occupation No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Eq. (2)
Promote0 1.442⁎ 1.396⁎ 1.422⁎ 1.395⁎ 0.629⁎ 0.492⁎ 0.509⁎ 0.473⁎
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.051) (0.094) (0.088) (0.107)
Female×promote0 −0.063⁎⁎ 0.011
(0.026) (0.054)
Rating1 −0.023⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎ −0.022⁎⁎ −0.031⁎ 0.014 0.0001 −0.003 −0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018)
Rating2 −0.002 0.004 0.003 −0.009 0.045⁎ 0.042⁎ 0.042⁎ 0.033⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Rating3 −0.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.022⁎⁎ −0.022⁎⁎ −0.017 −0.028⁎⁎ −0.033⁎⁎⁎ −0.035⁎⁎⁎ −0.027⁎







σ̂α 0.171 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.529 0.462 0.472 0.448
Notes: The sample includes a balanced panel of 27,965 individuals for three periods (83,895 total). All regressions include year dummies, service (Air Force, Army, other DOD), age,
race (white, black, Hispanic, other), advanced degrees (Master's, Doctorate), and occupation where indicated (professional, administrative, clerical, technical, and other white
collar). The estimates are obtained using the random effects probit routine of Stata®. Asymptotic standard errors appear in parentheses. Marginal probabilities appear in square
brackets and are calculated as suggested in Wooldridge (2005). For Eq. (2) marginal effects were not calculated as the focus is on the sign of the relationship between ci and
observables.
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 10%.
*** Significant at 5%.
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in-grade requirements) may be in place. The internal labor market
literature finds a similar convexity of earnings (Belzil and Bognanno,
2008).
When conditioning on hierarchical position, we find that within-
grade level, there is no gender gap in promotions (Table 4, models
(1)–(2)). Therefore, while women in the organization are observed to
promote more frequently, compared to men in the same grade (and
with similar tenure, education, and performance), they have an equal
probability of promotion. This within-grade evidence, however,
obscures the fact that among women there is a noticeable disparity
in career tracks. Model (3) in Table 4, which includes an interaction of
prior promotions with female, reveals that women are found in both
‘fast tracks’ and ‘slow tracks,’ depending upon their promotion
history. Women who promoted in the past are more likely than
men to promote in the current period. In contrast, among workers
who did not promote in the past, women are less likely than men topromote in the current period. This suggests that the organization
observes and incorporates heterogeneity that signals ‘career-oriented’
females.
Within-grade estimates of the effect of performance on promo-
tions are about twice as large in magnitude as across grade estimates,
suggesting that performance evaluations are more relevant in
predicting promotions within a grade rather than across grades.
The L&R model suggests that within jobs and higher up in the
hierarchy the differential thresholds for advancement disappear
because the type of the worker is revealed to the organization. Indeed,
we no longer find that women need to pass a higher performance
threshold for promotion. In fact, we find the opposite: the same
performance improvement counts more for women than for men (by a
modest 0.5 percentage points more). This evidence suggests that the
unobserved heterogeneity is most likely gender-neutral. Women who
have overcome the earlier hurdles, and who are at the same grade level
as men, are more likely to advance because of their better performance
22 When we estimate separate models with only one interaction of a lagged
supervisor position and female at a time (not shown), the interactions appear
individually insignificant.
Table 4
Within-grade estimates of promotions to a higher grade level.
Eq. (1) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Promotet−1 −0.188⁎ −0.182⁎ −0.301⁎ −0.179⁎
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028)
[−0.051] [−0.049] [−0.079] [−0.048]
Female −0.024 −0.013 −0.149⁎ −0.004
(0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.052)
[−0.007] [−0.004] [−0.041] [−0.001]
Ratingt−1 −0.174⁎ −0.172⁎ −0.172⁎ −0.110⁎
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
[−0.049] [−0.049] [−0.048] [−0.031]
Pay-gradet−1 −2.698⁎ −2.709⁎ −2.732⁎ −2.719⁎
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
[−0.764] [−0.765] [−0.772] [−0.768]









Occupation No Yes Yes Yes
Eq. (2)
Promote0 0.954⁎ 0.958⁎ 0.930⁎ 0.956⁎
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020)
Female×promote0 0.080⁎⁎⁎
(0.035)
Rating1 0.040⁎ 0.039⁎ 0.037⁎ −0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Rating2 0.050⁎ 0.049⁎ 0.048⁎ 0.024
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Rating3 0.005 0.001 −0.001 0.005







Pay grade1 0.603⁎ 0.601⁎ 0.615⁎ 0.605⁎
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Pay grade2 1.048⁎ 1.050⁎ 1.059⁎ 1.055⁎
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Pay grade3 1.120⁎ 1.126⁎ 1.125⁎ 1.127⁎
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
σ̂α 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180
See notes for Table 3. There was not enough variation in the data to estimate models
with two lags of promotions, when conditioning upon pay grade.
1005E. Pema, S. Mehay / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 998–1009and because they have demonstrated that they are type-Aworkers. This
hypothesis is further supported by estimates of Eq. (2) in panel B,which
indicate that, given the same position in the hierarchy, the first
promotion is more important for women thanmen.When conditioning
upon the entire history of transitions across pay grades, performance
ratings appear negatively correlated with unobserved heterogeneity.
However, this finding is driven by the women in the sample, whose
unobserved characteristics apparently are negatively correlated with
performance. This observation is also consistent with the hypothesis
that women have better alternative uses of time.
When including grade level in Eq. (1) (estimates presented in
Table 4), the effect of tenure drops dramatically and is no longer
significant, suggesting that tenure and position in the hierarchy are
strongly correlated. Thus, our previous results suggesting a
negative tenure effect were indeed driven by the limited hierar-
chical steps available to those who have been with the organization
longer. Finally, in the estimates of Eq. (2), we notice that the history
of hierarchical positions occupied is positively correlated with
unobserved heterogeneity, as expected.5.2. Estimates of supervisory–management promotions.
Next, we investigate gender differences in the likelihood of
occupying supervisory ormanagerial positions. Across grade estimates
are presented in Table 5 and use similar specifications as the overall
promotion models. In all cases, employees who are supervisors in one
period appear farmore likely to continue holding such a position in the
next period. In models (5)–(8) that include two lags of supervisory
positions, the persistence appears to wane significantly after the first
lag. While being a supervisor in t−1 carries with it a 0.75 higher
probability of being a supervisor currently, a supervisor position in
t−2 carries only a 0.07 higher probability of persisting in this position.
Overall, within the organization, females appear less likely to be in
supervisory positions. In the simpler one lag specification we find no
evidence that thestatedependencediffersbygender.However, in themore
flexible two-lag models, we find that a t−1 supervisory position for a
woman positively affects current supervisor status, whereas a t−2
supervisory position has the opposite effect. This finding is not puzzling if
we consider that the negative t−2 effect represents women who are
supervisors in t−2butnot in t−1. This suggests that theremaybeon- and
off-ramps in this organization, where loss of a supervisory position
negatively affects future promotions to supervisor for women.22 Perfor-
mance ratings have a stronger effect on supervisory promotions than on
simple grade promotions, suggesting that these positions may require
higher ability or a higher rate of human capital accumulation. In addition,
tenure has a strong positive effect on promotions to supervisor, perhaps
because firm-specific training is more important for these positions.
When looking at Eq. (2) estimates (panel B of Table 5), we find that
the first supervisory promotion is positively correlated with unob-
served heterogeneity, but this correlation is significantly weaker for
women. Where significant, performance ratings over time appear to
be positively correlated with unobserved heterogeneity.
Since supervisory promotions may depend on crucial promotion
points, orminimumgrade level requirements,we also investigatewithin-
grade models for supervisor positions. The estimates are presented in
Table 6. While the state dependence estimated by the first lag is of the
same inmagnitudeas in theacrossgrade results in Table5, theeffect of the
second lag is about half as large as estimated previously. We again find
that gender differences shrink considerably when conditioning upon job
level. In fact, holding constant the prior job level, women appear slightly
more likely to obtain supervisory positions (by about one percentage
point). Similar towithin-grade estimates of grade promotions, females do
not appear to face higher hurdles to promote to supervisor. According to
one-lag models, females are not in different career tracks from men.
However, the two-lagmodels indicate that being a supervisor in t−2 but
not in t−1 has a negative effect on holding a supervisory position in the
current period. Alternatively, being a supervisor in t−1 but not in t−2
has a positive effect on current promotion to supervisor. For womenwho
have been supervisors in both t−1 and t−2, these effects cancel out so
that women appear to be just as likely to promote as men. These findings
taken together suggest that there may be a penalty for women who step
down from supervisory positions.
Estimates of Eq. (2) reveal that the first promotion is positively
correlated with unobserved heterogeneity, for both men and women.
Paired with the same conclusion for within-grade comparisons of grade
promotions, we interpret this finding to be consistent with the L&R
model, which suggests that worker heterogeneity in promotions is
revealed over the course of the career and that, within-grade, men and
women are similar. It is across grades thatwe find thefirst promotion (to
a higher grade or supervisory position) to vary in importance for each
gender. More specifically, across grades we find unobserved heteroge-
neity to be negatively correlated with the first promotion for women.
Table 5
Across grade estimates of promotions to a supervisory or managerial position.
Eq. (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Supervisort−1 2.205⁎ 2.166⁎ 2.152⁎ 2.166⁎ 2.387⁎ 2.364⁎ 2.339⁎ 2.364⁎
(0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025)
[0.709] [0.696] [0.693] [0.696] [0.759] [0.753] [0.748] [0.753]
Supervisort−2 0.221⁎ 0.214⁎ 0.265⁎ 0.215⁎
(0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.040)
[0.071] [0.068] [0.085] [0.068]
Female −0.229⁎ −0.174⁎ −0.160⁎ −0.316⁎ −0.161⁎ −0.111⁎ −0.099⁎ −0.279⁎
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.058) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.059)
[−0.062] [−0.046] [−0.043] [−0.082] [−0.048] [−0.033] [−0.030] [−0.082]
Ratingt−1 −0.185⁎ −0.166⁎ −0.166⁎ −0.173⁎ −0.149⁎ −0.150⁎ −0.149⁎ −0.151⁎
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
[−0.052] [−0.046] [−0.046] [−0.048] [−0.046] [−0.046] [−0.045] [−0.046]
Log (tenuret) 0.445⁎ 0.444⁎ 0.444⁎ 0.375⁎ 0.374⁎ 0.373⁎
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)










Occupation No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Eq. (2)
Supervisor0 0.817⁎ 0.776⁎ 0.810⁎ 0.776⁎ 0.337⁎ 0.294⁎ 0.287⁎ 0.294⁎
(0.068) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.038)
Female supervisor0 −0.162⁎⁎⁎ 0.007
(0.064) (0.088)
Rating1 −0.088⁎ −0.091⁎ −0.092⁎ −0.086⁎ −0.114⁎ −0.110⁎ −0.112⁎ −0.121⁎
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Rating2 −0.003 −0.010 −0.010 −0.024 −0.005 −0.006 −0.006 −0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
Rating3 −0.078⁎ −0.082⁎ −0.081⁎ −0.089⁎ −0.024⁎⁎ −0.026⁎⁎ −0.026⁎⁎ −0.033⁎⁎⁎







σ̂α 0.195 0.204 0.203 0.204 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210
See notes for Table 3.
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or loss of a supervisory position). In our sample, there are 1227 demotions
to a lower grade, but only 6 individuals are demoted more than once.
About 1882 individuals lose their supervisory positions. In investigating
both types of demotions, we found no systematic differences between
men and women, after conditioning upon all observables.23
In addition to illustrating how unobserved heterogeneity relates to
observables, our methodology provides consistent estimates of the state
dependence in promotions. In contrast, simple pooled probit estimates
(displayed in Appendix Table A1) overestimate the serial correlation in
both types of promotions, the problem being more severe in grade level
promotions.24 In models with two lags in promotions, pooled probit
estimates of the first lag are similar to the random effects probit
estimates; estimates of the second lag, however, are substantially
larger. Pooled probit estimates also tend to overestimate the gender23 Results are available upon request.
24 Other studies similarly find that state dependence is overestimated in models that
do not condition upon unobserved heterogeneity (see Heckman, 1981b). Note that we
estimate a negative state dependence for grade level promotions, so the bias should be
interpreted in this context.gap in several specifications.25 In a similar vein, pooled probit
estimates also suggest that women have to jump higher performance
hurdles both across and within grades compared to random effects
estimates. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
unobserved heterogeneity, when controlled for, explains away part
of the gender differences in promotions. Admittedly, our approach
does not impose sufficient structure to eliminate the spuriousness in
the state dependence induced by administrative constraints. How-
ever, assuming the limited hierarchical steps equally affect both men
and women in this organization, our estimates of the gender
differences in promotion tracks should be free of this spuriousness.
At aminimum, our results provide further descriptive evidence of the
sources of gender career differences within organizations.
6. Conclusions
Our results suggest that gender differences in careers are driven by
a combination of observed variables, most notably tenure, occupation,25 Note that all models in the appendix include occupation and tenure. As a result,
models (1)–(3) in Table A1 are comparable to models (2)–(4) in Tables 3 and 5, whereas
models (4)–(6) in Table A1 are comparable to models (6)-(8) in Tables 3 and 5.
26 ‘Sticky floors’ refers to the situation where women's promotion rates are similar to
men, but their wage growth upon promotion is lower (see Booth et al., 2003). Since in
our data wages are rigidly tied to job levels, promotions and wage growth move in
tandem. However, for our purposes, the term adequately illustrates the situation in
which women are not promoted to positions of higher responsibility because they are
stuck in lower grade levels.
Table 6
Within-grade estimates of promotions to a supervisory or managerial position.
Eq. (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Supervisort−1 2.293⁎ 2.286⁎ 2.267⁎ 2.285⁎ 2.402⁎ 2.400⁎ 2.364⁎ 2.399⁎
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027)
[0.727] [0.725] [0.721] [0.725] [0.750] [0.749] [0.741] [0.749]
Supervisort−2 0.149⁎ 0.148⁎ 0.190⁎ 0.148⁎
(0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043)
[0.043] [0.043] [0.055] [0.043]
Female 0.044⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎ 0.023 0.093⁎⁎ 0.052⁎⁎⁎ 0.036⁎⁎ 0.019 0.047
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.053) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.064)
[0.012] [0.008] [0.006] [0.026] [0.015] [0.010] [0.005] [0.013]
Ratingt−1 −0.179⁎ −0.171⁎ −0.171⁎ −0.170⁎ −0.147⁎ −0.146⁎ −0.145⁎ −0.140⁎
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
[−0.049] [−0.047] [−0.047] [−0.047] [−0.041] [−0.041] [−0.041] [−0.039]
Pay-gradet−1 −0.111⁎ −0.124⁎ −0.124⁎ −0.124⁎ −0.339⁎ −0.344⁎ −0.344⁎ −0.344⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
[−0.030] [−0.034] [−0.034] [−0.034] [−0.095] [−0.096] [−0.096] [−0.096]
Log (tenuret) 0.201⁎ 0.201⁎ 0.201⁎ 0.217⁎ 0.218⁎ 0.217⁎
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)










Occupation No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Eq. (2)
Supervisor0 0.409⁎ 0.375⁎ 0.391⁎ 0.375⁎ 0.297⁎ 0.266⁎ 0.248⁎ 0.266⁎
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.040)
Female×supervisor0 −0.060 0.080
(0.059) (0.093)
Rating1 −0.043⁎ −0.042⁎ −0.042⁎ −0.026⁎⁎ −0.083⁎ −0.081⁎ −0.081⁎ −0.080⁎
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
Rating2 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 −0.004
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Rating3 −0.034⁎ −0.031⁎ −0.031⁎ −0.028⁎⁎⁎ 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.011







Pay grade1 0.050⁎ 0.049⁎ 0.049⁎ 0.049⁎ −0.005 −0.024 −0.025 −0.024
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Pay grade2 0.027 0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.036⁎⁎⁎ 0.183⁎ 0.187⁎ 0.187⁎ 0.187⁎
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Pay grade3 0.312⁎ 0.314⁎ 0.315⁎ 0.315⁎ 0.453⁎ 0.460⁎ 0.461⁎ 0.460⁎
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
σ̂α 0.213 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.206
See notes for Table 3.
1007E. Pema, S. Mehay / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 998–1009and position in the hierarchy, as well as unobserved heterogeneity.
We find evidence that: (1) females promote more often because we
initially observe them in lower-level positions; (2) females need
higher performance ratings to move up the hierarchy; (3) within
narrowly-defined jobs females can be both on fast and slow tracks,
based on their history of promotions; (4) position in the hierarchy
explains the largest portion of the gender gap in promotion
probabilities; and (5) that unobservables work against women's
promotion probability, consistent with the hypothesis that females
have higher productivity in non-market activities.
Given that these models are equivalent to wage models
(individual pay growth occurs primarily via grade changes), the
L&R hypotheses with respect to gender wage differences are largely
supported. In investigating ‘glass ceilings’ in the federal service, wefind evidence of ‘sticky floors.’26 In our data, females are less likely
to be in managerial positions primarily because they are concen-
trated in lower pay grades. However, within the same pay grade
level (and also conditional on performance, specific and general
human capital, occupation, and unobserved heterogeneity),
women's promotion probabilities are similar to or better than
those of men, suggesting that discrimination does not explain why
women are concentrated in lower-level positions. An alternative
1008 E. Pema, S. Mehay / Labour Economics 17 (2010) 998–1009explanation following Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller is that
women are assigned to lower positions upon hiring. We explored
this hypothesis by analyzing workers who were hired in 1986. We
find that women do enter at lower grades, but endowments explain
most of these differences.27 As a result, while human capital
endowments are important in explaining gender differences in
career progression, job assignment is one of the strongest factors
driving promotions to higher grades (pay differences) and to
supervisory positions among professional workers.
One additional contribution of this paper is that it separates the
effects of promotions that result in wage growth from promotions
that involve a change in duties and responsibilities. Due to less-clear
definitions of hierarchical steps and job titles in most prior studies
using internal firm data, the literature often combines both events in
the definition of a promotion. However, incentives and specific
human capital may have varying importance for each type of27 Ordered probit estimates indicate that women are more likely to enter in grades 3
and 5 (by 0.03 and 0.10 percentage points, respectively) and less likely to enter in grades
7, 9, and 11 (by about 0.05 percentage points). However, education and occupation
explain about half to two-thirds of these differences. Full results available upon request.
Table A1
Pooled probit estimates.
Outcome: promotion to a higher pay grade
Panel A. Across grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (
Promotet−1 −0.230 −0.307 −0.231 −0.188 −0.271 −
(0.014)⁎ (0.017)⁎ (0.014)⁎ (0.014)⁎ (0.018)⁎ (
Promotet−2 −0.125 −0.151 −
(0.019)⁎ (0.023)⁎ (
Female 0.135 0.091 −0.042 0.136 0.046 −
(0.011)⁎ (0.013)⁎ (0.028) (0.014)⁎ (0.019)⁎⁎ (
Ratingt−1 −0.087 −0.087 −0.119 −0.121 −0.123 −








Outcome: promotion to supervisor
Supervisort−1 2.612 2.627 2.612 2.370 2.346 2
(0.015)⁎ (0.017)⁎ (0.015)⁎ (0.025)⁎ (0.028)⁎ (
Supervisort−2 0.398 0.444 0
(0.027)⁎ (0.031)⁎ (
Female −0.143 −0.127 −0.222 −0.104 −0.090 −
(0.016)⁎ (0.018)⁎ (0.038)⁎ (0.019)⁎ (0.022)⁎ (
Ratingt−1 −0.222 −0.223 −0.235 −0.240 −0.240 −






Female×rating t−1 0.042 0
(0.018)⁎⁎ (
Notes: The sample includes27,965 individuals for threeperiods (83,895 total). All regressions in
occupation, and tenure. Since all observables are included, models (1)–(3) in Table A1 are co
comparable to models (6)–(8) in Tables 3 and 5. Similarly, models (7)–(9) above are compara
models (6)–(8) in Table 6. The estimates are obtained via probit on the pooled sample.
* Significant at 1%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 10%.promotion. Our data allow us to disentangle these effects and show
that title-promotions, which involve a change in responsibilities, are
characterized by entirely different dynamics than promotions that
involve only salary growth. Most importantly, while administrative
constraints (such as ‘green card’ effects, or time-in-grade restric-
tions) may induce negative correlation in wage growth over time,
promotions that involve changes in responsibilities (and require
different skills or higher ability) are characterized by substantial
positive persistence over time.
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comments.Appendix APanel B. Within-grade
6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.190 −0.126 −0.213 −0.125 −0.107 −0.199 −0.109
0.015)⁎ (0.014)⁎ (0.018)⁎ (0.014)⁎ (0.015)⁎ (0.018)⁎ (0.015)⁎
0.126 −0.047 −0.083 −0.046
0.020)⁎ (0.020)⁎⁎ (0.024)⁎ (0.020)⁎⁎
0.069 −0.030 −0.082 −0.243 −0.004 −0.109 −0.270
0.034)⁎⁎ (0.012)⁎⁎ (0.013)⁎ (0.029)⁎ (0.015) (0.020)⁎ (0.046)⁎
0.161 −0.116 −0.117 −0.155 −0.145 −0.148 −0.188
0.010)⁎ (0.007)⁎ (0.007)⁎ (0.008)⁎ (0.008)⁎ (0.008)⁎ (0.011)⁎
−0.134 −0.134 −0.134 −0.113 −0.115 −0.115







.370 2.480 2.498 2.480 2.251 2.235 2.251
0.025)⁎ (0.016)⁎ (0.018)⁎ (0.016)⁎ (0.025)⁎ (0.029)⁎ (0.025)⁎
.398 0.381 0.420 0.381
0.027)⁎ (0.027)⁎ (0.031)⁎ (0.027)⁎
0.204 −0.006 0.011 −0.042 0.023 0.039 −0.015
0.046)⁎ (0.017) (0.018) (0.039) (0.020) (0.023)⁎⁎⁎ (0.048)
0.256 −0.203 −0.203 −0.208 −0.223 −0.224 −0.229
0.013)⁎ (0.009)⁎ (0.009)⁎ (0.010)⁎ (0.011)⁎ (0.011)⁎ (0.013)⁎
0.172 0.171 0.172 0.158 0.158 0.158







clude yeardummies, service (Air Force, Army, andotherDOD), age, race, advanceddegrees,
mparable to models (2)–(4) in Tables 3 and 5, whereas models (4)–(6) in Table A1 are
ble to models (2)–(4) in Tables 4 and 6, and models (10)–(12) above are comparable to
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